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1. INTRODUCTION
Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine is of the view that America is in terrible
shape.' Specifically, he identifies deep problems in the fabric of American socie-
ty, which include "growing income inequality, inflated executive pay, job losses,
[and] wage stagnation."2 Having noted these problems, Strine lays a portion of
the blame at the feet of activist hedge funds and the apparently misguided pen-
sion plans and university endowments that invest in such hedge funds.' In this
Essay, I articulate Strine's worldview and argue that while his Feature in this
issue of the Yale Law journal is ostensibly about hedge fund activists, his real
complaint is with modernity itself. Hedge funds are merely piling on.4 Accord-
1. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge
Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 Yale L.J. 1870, 1950 (2017)
("Median income has stagnated since the early 1970s. Productivity increases have slowed
and wages never did fully experience the benefit of the rapid productivity increases of the
last two decades. Economic growth is stagnant. The government has been compelled to
provide giant subsidies to corporations engaged in risky commercial conduct."); see also id.
("Looking at the big and systemic facts from the perspective of an average American human
investor, the world is not an optimistic place.").
2. Id. at 1951.
3. Id. at 1917-22, 1934.
4. Id. at 1951 (asking whether it adds "socially useful value for activist investors with short-
term perspectives to put additional pressure" on American public corporations in light of the
"vigorous international and domestic competition" that is "already acting" on these compa-
nies).
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ingly, his proposed solutions, which focus largely on disclosure and reporting
requirements, are misplaced in the current debate.
On Strine's account, hedge funds are wolves, and ordinary "human" citi-
zens bleed when these funds engage in activist corporate governance. Critical to
this account are Strine's nostalgic views of the public corporation and the role
played by the citizen-shareholders of what he describes as the "corporate re-
public."' Nationalism is also a concern, as Strine worries that, "with the global-
ization of not only product and service markets, but [also] stock ownership it-
self, corporations have increasingly lost any genuine national identity.'
This Essay argues that the maladies of job insecurity and income inequality
that Strine identifies in his Feature are, fundamentally, due to the broad forces
of globalization. Therefore, changing aspects of the corporate governance land-
scape, such as asking hedge funds to disclose more of their operations, will not
remedy the situation. Part II of this Essay describes Strine's idealized historical
view of the public corporation and its modern discontents. Part III casts doubt
on the extent o which activist hedge funds can fairly be blamed for exacerbat-
ing the broad social problems that afflict the country and suggests that globali-
zation and technological change are the real culprits. Part IV discusses Strine's
thesis that workers who fund pension funds with their retirement savings may
later find that these savings have been invested with activist hedge funds whose
activism results in corporate downsizing that ultimately leads to the workers'
unemployment. While this is undoubtedly true, I believe that retirees would
want to invest their money in activist hedge funds even in light of this fact -as
long as the hedge funds generated significant returns for the workers. In Part V,
I argue that hedge funds have not been particularly successful in their activist
investment strategies and that pension funds are moving away from invest-
ments in activist hedge funds. This observation undermines Strine's central
thesis that corporate governance needs to focus more on human investors and
that activist hedge funds, as well as the broader corporate governance failures
through which they operate, represent a threat to the American workers. Ra-
ther, globalization will spell changes for these hedge funds that will facilitate
long-term investment approaches. The reason for this outcome is that it is
difficult- indeed virtually impossible-to beat the markets for any sustained
period of time. Competition in the debts, products, and services markets forces
corporations to do what hedge fund activists already pressure corporations to
do: downsize and operate at the outer limits of their capabilities. My analysis
shifts the blame away from activist hedge funds for the current hyper-
s. Id. at 1956-70.
6. Id. at 1873.
7. Id. at 1933.
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competitiveness that characterizes the corporate world without denying that
hyper-competitiveness is what characterizes this world.
II. THE GOOD OLD DAYS
Strine assumes that in the beginning, when "corporations were first char-
tered under general, not special, legislation," stockholders functioned as demo-
cratic citizens, holding managers accountable through elections and, occasion-
ally, direct democracy.' In the good old days, "[s]tockholders were mostly
human beings [who] invested for the long term, options for trading were lim-
ited, and they made their own voting decisions."'
According to Strine, activist stockholders in those days tended to be those
who "had the longest-term stake in the corporation.""o Additionally, corporate
operators at all levels -from managers and directors to employees and stock-
holders -held connections to the communities in which the corporation oper-
ated, and "corporate managers were well but not lavishly paid.""
However, Strine contends that the loyalty of corporate citizens has since de-
clined due to the "unmooring of corporate citizenship."12 He laments that, up-
on purchasing shares of stock in a company, hedge fund activists now immedi-
ately become full-fledged citizens of the corporate republic in which they have
invested.13 Further, Strine argues that unlike the good old days, people with
interests in a corporation are neither "tied to any natural conception of citizen-
ship," nor bound to the community of the corporation.14 Also regrettable is the
fact that corporate activists are no longer long-term investors with an interest
in stability but rather are hedge funds with an interest in changing business
plans to "reap a profit over a period that can be as short as a handful of
months."1"
8. Id. at 1910.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1871.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1932.
13. Strine bemoans the ease through which this process can now occur. Id. at 1928 (" [T] his cor-
porate republic has a concept of citizenship that is truly remarkable in its liberality. There is
no waiting period or application process to be a citizen, or even to be elected to the highest
office of this republic; buying stock is all that is required, and you can come and go largely
as you please.").
14. Id. at 1932. Instead of local connections, Strine opines that "so-called American corporations
have a large international investor base and derive large portions of their revenues from off-
shore operations,' which further reduces the investor citizenship. Id.
15. Id. at 1928.
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III. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
Strine's romantic vision of a golden past underpins the grim worldview re-
flected in his Feature. While it is highly doubtful that the good old days were
quite as wonderful as Strine imagines them to have been, it is undeniably true
that there have been seismic changes in the world since the early days of gen-
eral corporate chartering. It is worth pondering why such changes have oc-
curred.
In my view, the changes that Strine bemoans are the inevitable consequenc-
es of globalization in general and particularly of advances in information tech-
nology and connectedness that reduce the importance of physical distance for
investors and managers. Because of technology, managers and hedge fund ac-
tivists can now get information about a corporation's actions and performance
from multiple sources around the globe virtually instantaneously, drastically
reducing the importance of physical distance in corporate governance. Just as
this has made it possible for managers to direct global enterprises from afar, so
too have improvements in information flows and technology made it possible
for financial analysts to evaluate relative corporate performance with greater
precision and accuracy. When a company begins to underperform its peer
group, the investor community will notice and pressure that company's man-
agement to improve performance. Activist hedge funds are only the most visi-
ble manifestation of a corporate governance infrastructure that puts corporate
managers under constant and close supervision. To be sure, hedge funds have
become more activist, but so have corporate boards of directors and other insti-
tutional investors.1 6
According to basic economic theory, technological changes lead to econom-
ic growth because they expand the scope of production possibilities." Few are-
as have been affected more by technological changes than capital markets.
These changes in capital markets have profoundly influenced the patterns of
share ownership in turn. Specifically, the ability of computers to receive, ana-
lyze, and transmit large amounts of data means that information about corpo-
16. See Yaron Nili, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A New Approach to Shareholder Activism, 4
HARV. Bus. L. REV. 157, 175 (2014) (noting increases in activist behavior in hedge funds);
Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of
Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. REG. 174, 175 (2001) (noting the historical roots of institu-
tional investor activism).
17. Susanto Basu et al., Productivity Growth in the 1990s: Technology, Utilization, orAdjustment?, 55
CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES PUB. POL'Y 117, 153 (2001) (finding that the "recent in-
crease in the pace of productivity [in the latter half of the 199os] does correspond to an in-
crease in technology").
18. See Tom C.W Lin, The New Investor, 6o UCLA L. REV. 678, 678 (2013) (noting the "sea
change" that technology has brought to capital markets).
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rate performance has become vastly more detailed over time." It is now possi-
ble for investors, directors, and others to make very granular distinctions about
how a corporation is doing in particular markets at particular moments in time.
Technology is also making it increasingly easier and faster to compare the per-
formance of multiple corporations and to make trading decisions on the basis
of those comparisons. It is these changes, not the actions of activist hedge
funds, that are the root causes of the ever-increasing pressure to improve cor-
porate performance.
Strine's nostalgia is understandable under the circumstances. Take for ex-
ample his claim that stockholders historically functioned as democratic "citi-
zens" to hold managers, "the elected officials," accountable through elections,
direct votes on important matters, and other checks and balances.20 Unlike this
idealized depiction, however, reality was a bit more complicated. Shareholders
face a well-known agency problem because they necessarily entrust the compa-
nies in which they have invested to managers whose interests may diverge from
their own.2 1 Mitigating this problem is costly and requires investors either to
exercise their exit rights by withdrawing from the corporation through selling
their shares or else to use their limited voice to influence the company's opera-
tions by expressing their dissatisfaction and petitioning for change.22
Exit and voice are substitutes. As exit becomes easier, dissatisfied investors
will more likely choose to exit and move on to different investments rather than
exercise their voices to articulate their complaints and agitate for change.23 As a
result of technological improvements over time, stock markets have become
more liquid and market depth has improved.24 These changes have made exit
ig. Michael D. Goldman & Eileen M. Filliben, Corporate Governance: Current Trends and Likely
Developments for the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 703 (2000).
20. Strine, supra note 1, at 1910.
21. The agency problems inherent in corporate governance are well established. See Victor
Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1403, 1443 (1985) ("The prevailing structure of corporate governance gives corporate man-
agement substantial discretion to reward itself and to satisfice - that is, to limit its input at
the cost of realizable corporate wealth."); Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dy-
namics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. REG. 455, 472 (1988) (noting that
"[m]anagerial decisions ... generally will not be made in the best interests of every share-
holder in a corporation").
22. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 39-40 (1970).
23. See Emeka Duruigbo, Stimulating Long-Term Shareholding, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1733, 1760-62
(2012) (noting the well-established shareholder preference for exit over voice when liquidity
exists).
24. Pankaj K. Jain & William F. Johnson, Trading Technology and Stock Market Liquidity: A Global
Perspective, in STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE AND
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from the corporation through the sale of securities a far more attractive option
compared to voice in the form of corporate governance activism, at least for
smaller or well-diversified investors. Similarly, as corporations have become
larger and as markets have become more liquid, voice has become a less desira-
ble option.25 Simply put, because selling has become easier, exercising one's
rights as a corporate citizen has become relatively less attractive. So again, eco-
nomics and technological advancement explain the decline in the demand for
the "republican election principles and elements of direct democracy" that
Strine laments.2 6 Hedge funds have simply moved into this empty space.
Technological change explains investors' shorter-term time horizon as well.
As markets became more informationally efficient, share prices more quickly
and accurately reflected information about future returns to investors.27 This is
because shares of stock are, after all, financial assets, and their current price re-
flects the market's unbiased assessment of the present value of the expected
cash flows to investors.2 in more efficient markets, shareholders do not have to
hold onto their shares as long in order for the share prices to reflect the compa-
nies' actual economic values.29 Long ago, shareholders may have had to invest
for the long term because it might have taken a long time for share prices to re-
flect fundamental values. As markets have become more efficient, share prices
reflect value more quickly, largely obviating the need for long-term investing.o
Shareholders who do not work for the companies in which they are invested
ASSET PRICING 287, 287 (2008) ("Computerization and satellite communication have trans-
formed the industrial organization of stock exchanges and dramatically improved secondary
market liquidity.").
25. The effectiveness of voice declines as a shareholder's control of a company declines, while
the availability of exit increases as markets offer increased diversification and liquidity to
shareholders. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1287-88 (1991).
26. Strine, supra note 1, at 1910.
27. A market is informationally efficient if, with respect to a certain set of information about the
assets that trade in that market, it is not possible to obtain trading profits by buying and
selling in that market, where profits is defined as risk adjusted returns net of costs. See Mi-
chael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95
(1978) ("I believe there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical
evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis.").
28. The market's assessment is unbiased in the sense that trading profits can be made whenever
the market price of a security is either too low or too high. As such, the market will not be
biased in one direction of the other.
29. Jensen, supra note 27, at 95.
30. See David Min, Corporate Political Activity and Non-Shareholder Agency Costs, 33 YALE J. REG.
423, 448-49 & n.124 (2016) (contrasting the long-term interests of employees with the
short-term interests of shareholders in efficient markets).
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have no particular incentive to invest in a particular company for the long term,
especially if other more attractive investments become available.
Information technology also explains what Strine apparently regards as the
regrettable fact that activist hedge funds are opportunistic. He argues that
hedge funds are not long-suffering shareholders who became dissatisfied with
corporate policies and advocated quietly for a change in direction.31 Rather
they come in from the outside and then push for changes to realize profits over
a period of several months to a couple of years at most.32 To the extent that
hedge fund investors are identifying undervalued companies and urging
changes to increase their value, this shorter-term time horizon is a good thing.
Undeniably, hedge funds often get it wrong." Yet, even in those cases, their
shorter-term time horizon serves to discipline the hedge funds by forcing them
to realize any gains or losses associated with their activism within a relatively
short period of time.
In earlier times, when it was hard for outside investors to obtain infor-
mation about companies, they had to invest and become involved in govern-
ance and management merely to discover the nature of the problems afflicting
a corporation. With the modern abundance of detailed financial information in
publically available quarterly and annual reporting, institutional investors like
hedge funds can identify and diagnose corporate pathologies before they invest.
While the resulting dynamic may seem cold and impersonal, it means that out-
side activist investors face historically low costs of engagement. This allows the
activist investors to realize efficiencies in the form of economies of scale and
economies of scope by specializing in evaluating public reports to discover un-
dervalued corporations and treating them as opportunities to obtain arbitrage
gains.
In other words, activist hedge funds simply engage in the ancient game of
risk arbitrage. Risk arbitrage is the business of purchasing undervalued assets
and then working either to increase their value or to get others to recognize
that their value already is higher than the value assigned to them by the mar-
ket. Hedge funds are not doing anything that is different than what investors
have been doing for decades.34 They are simply doing it faster.
In addition to the technological improvements that increased market effi-
ciency, other factors contribute to the problems Strine identifies. For example,
31. Strine, supra note 1, at 1928-29.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1931.
34. See Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical Evi-
dence, 7 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 459, 466 (2013) ("At its most basic level, hedge fund activism can
be described as a recent variant of shareholder activism.").
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stricter enforcement of legal rules barring insider trading has also reduced the
value to investors of having close physical proximity to corporate headquarters.
In the past, shareholders may have wanted to be close to the primary source of
information about their company in order to avoid being surprised by new
events that might affect the value of their shares. Rules barring trading on the
basis of material, nonpublic information, however, have curbed the advantages
of being a local investor. This result has shifted investor reliance to other
sources of information to gain an edge in the market. I believe that as financial
modeling and analysis have become more sophisticated, the demand for spe-
cialized expertise in evaluating corporate information and financial results has
grown. It follows that hedge funds are merely part of this larger trend.
More broadly, globalization further contributes to these changes in the na-
ture of corporate citizenship that Strine describes. As corporations have become
increasingly multinational in marketing their products and services, it is un-
surprising that they have attracted a correspondingly more international pool
of investors. Moreover, as technology has made it possible for corporations to
distribute information about themselves simultaneously to investors world-
wide, investors' need to be physically close to the source of corporate infor-
mation has diminished.
Thus, it is not surprising that the concept of citizenship in the corporate re-
public has become "remarkable in its liberality."" When Strine talks about this
concept, he is apparently referring to the ease with which one can become a
corporate citizen. There are no prerequisites such as residency requirements or
employment in the corporation. Of course, existing shareholders are free to
impose conditions on share ownership that make corporate citizenship more
difficult. These conditions often come in the form of share transfer restrictions.
But shareholders eschew such restrictions in publicly held corporations for a
good reason. While it is not clear what sort of prerequisites to citizenship
Strine is advocating for, no shareholder, regardless of whether she views herself
as a net buyer or a net seller of shares, would benefit from a rule requiring a
waiting period or the completion of an application process in order for poten-
tial investors to purchase shares with full voting rights. Indeed, it would reduce
the shareholder's own liquidity in the market.
To summarize, this context of globalization and technological improve-
ments challenges many of Strine's proposed solutions. For example, Strine ar-
gues in favor of greater hedge fund disclosure and reporting requirements so
that "human investors, mainstream institutional investors, proxy advisory
firms, target corporations, and other participants in our corporate republic can
35. Strine, supra note 1, at 1928.
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understand an activist's overall economic positions."6 However, given that the
maladies he identifies are not catalyzed by hedge funds but rather by globaliza-
tion, these reforms will miss the mark.
IV. STRINE'S BIG FACTS
Another important issue raised in Strine's Feature is whether human inves-
tors benefit from the investments of their pensions in activist hedge funds and,
relatedly, from the changes these funds make in their employers.3 7 He indicates
that it is important to focus on more than what share prices are and whether
companies targeted by hedge funds enjoy durable increases in their share prices
after an intervention has occurred.
Supposedly, a narrow focus on share prices misses what Strine would call
the "bigger, more important" fact.39 He argues that workers may well be put-
ting their retirement savings in pension funds that then allocate those savings
to hedge funds, which in turn launch activist interventions against the very
companies that employ the workers who made the pension fund investments.
Strine reasons that if the hedge fund activist's intervention causes the company
to reduce staffing and thus causes the workers to lose their jobs, then activism
harmed the workers even if it did result in improvements in the target compa-
ny's share price.40 Workers are also harmed when the hedge funds, in which
their savings are indirectly and inadvertently allocated, underperform. And be-
cause hedge fund strategies often do fail in reality, it is a cruel joke that the
workers lose twice - first when they lose their jobs as a result of hedge fund ac-
tivism and second when their retirement savings underperform the market as a
result of the hedge funds' poor investment records.1
However, as argued in the next Part, pension funds will naturally stop in-
vesting in hedge funds as markets become more efficient, alleviating Strine's
immediate concerns. Specifically, hedge fund strategies are more likely to fail as
36. Id. at 1956.
37. Id. at 1951-52.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1951.
40. Id. ("[I] f competition in product and services markets has already squeezed out most of the
slack, the likelihood that pressures that predominantly involve demands for corporate fi-
nance moves like leveraging up, spin offs, or mergers will create incentives for corporations
to focus their energies on ways of making money that are also good for their workers and
society seems less probable.").
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improved market efficiency makes it harder to identify arbitrage opportunities.
But for the time being, Strine raises an interesting question: whether ordinary
investors, whose pension savings fuel some hedge fund activism, would stop
investing in activist hedge funds if they had enough information and could
control the allocation of their retirement funds (instead of being compelled to
delegate such decisions to their money managers). But the likelihood is that
even ordinary investors would continue to invest in activist hedge funds if
those funds generated outsized returns. To do otherwise would be self-
sabotage. Further, Strine's assumption that workers' pension funds should
cease to invest in activist hedge funds is flawed. Such a cessation in investment,
even if conducted on a grand scale, might slow down the pace of globalization
but creative destruction would still occur. Inefficient businesses would still fail,
be forced to downsize, or otherwise become more efficient. Greater recognition
of the "big fact" that pensioners are investing in activist hedge funds will not
change that reality.
Again, the broader point here is that the harms afflicting Strine's "human
investors" are rooted in the broad forces of globalization rather than hedge
funds. Changing features of the corporate governance landscape is not going to
alter this process.
V. A LESS UNHAPPY ENDING?
Happily, a careful review of the evidence -including the evidence cited by
Strine-reveals that things are not nearly as bad as he seems to think. Further
globalization and technological improvements will spell behavioral changes,
both for hedge funds and the pensions that currently invest in them. These
changes, in turn, will mitigate the threats Strine identifies.
As Strine recognizes, not all hedge funds are the same and some hedge
funds manage to both outperform the market and improve corporate perfor-
mance in ways that are beneficial rather than harmful to society. Specifically,
there is "emerging evidence suggesting that activist hedge funds prepared to
take a long-term position and work as fiduciaries to improve the performance
of the companies they target achieve a better market reaction."42
I agree. However, Strine's observation should be taken to its conclusion.
The efficient capital market hypothesis implies that it is virtually impossible for
an activist hedge fund to outperform the market without illegally using materi-
al inside information unless they improve corporate performance. And markets
42. Strine, supra note i at 1908 & n.133 (citing activist hedge fund Pershing Square's interven-
tion at Canadian Pacific, "one of the great corporate turnarounds in recent memory," which
brought an experienced new CEO in to run the railroad).
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are becoming more efficient over time as a result of the very meta-phenomena
of globalization and advances in communications technology that I observed in
Part III. As performance becomes more transparent, pressures will increase on
corporate earnings. Hedge funds are only part of this phenomenon. Corporate
managers who fail to run their companies to their full potential will find them-
selves under increasing pressure, with or without activist hedge funds.
Further, pensions will abandon those activist hedge funds that do not
change. As activist hedge funds underperform broad market indices like the
S&P 5oO,43 pension fund managers will likely turn their attention to index
funds that invest in actual companies that hire people, rather than hedge funds
that fail in their efforts to beat the market on a short-term basis.4" Much of the
problem that Strine identifies, then, appears to be temporary as pension fund
investors experience losses on their investments in hedge funds and those pen-
sion funds change their investment strategies. In 2014 for example, the largest
U.S. pension fund, CalPERS (the California Public Employees' Retirement
System), which had four billion dollars invested in hedge funds, decided to
stop investing in hedge funds altogether."5 This move is likely to influence oth-
er pension funds.6 In the long run, pensions will follow the best return, which
most likely will not be activist hedge funds. In other words, markets have a way
of sorting these problems out over relatively short periods of time.
43. See Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 77
(2003) ("A remarkably large body of evidence suggests that professional investment manag-
ers are not able to outperform index funds . . . ."); Nir Kaissar, Hedge Funds Have a Perfor-
mance Problem, BLOOMBERG GADFLY (Mar. 24, 2016, 10:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/gadfly/articles/2o16-o3-24/hedge-funds-have-a-performance-problem [http://
perma.cc/R5ZX-ZWU]; Walter Kurtz, The 2o-Year Performance of Hedge Funds and the S&P
Soo Are Almost Identical, Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2013, 8:43 AM), http://www
.businessinsider.com/hedge-funds-and-sp-500-nearly-identical-2013-8 [http://perma.cc
/KU8U-K3X3] ("Hedge funds continued to underperform the overall US equity mar-
ket.. .. ").
44. See Timothy W Martin, What Does Nevada's $35 Billion Fund Manager Do All Day? Nothing,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-does-nevadas-35-billion
-fund-manager-do-all-day-nothing-476887420 [http://perma.cc/3M9K-YXL3] (describing
the Nevada Public Employees' Retirement System, which invests exclusively in passive
funds and generates strong returns for its investors).
45. Dan Fitzpatrick, Calpers To Exit Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/calpers-to-exit-hedge-funds-141o821o83
[http://perma.cc/7B8M-8E9T].
46. Id. (predicting that the shift away from hedge funds by CalPERS "will likely influence oth-
ers because of its size and history as an early adopter of alternatives to stocks and bonds").
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CONCLUSION
Strine's world is a bleak dystopia in which those "human investors" saving
for retirement "are not so much citizens of the corporate governance republic as
they are the voiceless and choiceless many whose economic prospects turn on
power struggles among classes of haves who happen to control the capital -of
all kinds -of typical American investors."" The point of this Essay is not to re-
fute this claim, but rather to put it into context. The forces that focus manage-
rial attention on share price returns are global in nature and appear to me to be
the inevitable consequence of changes in information technology that make it
easier to gather, analyze, and act on information about corporate performance.
They are much broader than the comparatively narrow topic of corporate gov-
ernance.
Workers' retirement savings should be invested in the assets that offer the
highest returns available at the appropriate level of risk for such investors. It is
implausible that the fiduciaries who invest money on behalf of retirees are to
blame for the increasing uncertainty that plagues retirees and other investors.
Accordingly, corporate governance reforms, particularly those that further em-
phasize disclosure, will not solve Strine's issues. Rather, the inability of activist
hedge funds to beat the market will likely and naturally correct the course.
Jonathan Macey is the Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance
and Securities Law, Yale Law School.
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